Is the field interpreting p-values correctly, reporting effect sizes and intervals, and controlling error across multiple tests?
Week 8 argues that a p-value is only the probability of the data under the null, not the probability the effect is real or important; that the .05 threshold is an arbitrary convention rather than a switch; that effect sizes with confidence intervals interpreted against a smallest effect of interest are more informative than significance alone; and that testing many outcomes inflates the error rate. The empirical questions are whether the field interprets significance correctly, reports estimation, uses valid inference methods, and controls multiplicity.
Direct evidence shows the field is organised around the .05 threshold. Borg, Barnett, Caldwell, White and Stewart (2023) examined 3,819 confidence intervals from 1,599 articles across 18 sport and exercise medicine journals (2002–2022) and found a marked under-representation of results corresponding to p-values just above .05 and a corresponding excess just below it — the statistical signature of significance-chasing and publication bias. The authors note that an exclusive focus on statistical significance distorts the literature and exaggerates effect magnitudes, and recommend transparent practices such as Registered Reports.
Beyond misinterpreting valid tests, part of the field adopted an inference method that is not valid. Sainani (2018) demonstrated that magnitude-based inference (MBI) inflates the Type I error rate relative to standard inference, and a systematic review by Lohse, Sainani and colleagues (2020) identified 232 papers using MBI — typically with very small samples — producing Type I error rates of roughly 12–45%. This is a concrete instance of the field reaching statistical conclusions its methods could not support; MBI use has since declined following these critiques.
Estimation is still not the norm. Mesquida, Murphy, Lakens and Warne (2023) found the reporting of test statistics, effect sizes and confidence intervals in the Journal of Sports Sciences to be suboptimal, and Knudson (2017) documented recurrent statistical and reporting errors in biomechanics, including reliance on significance testing with small samples and inflated inferences. A further error-control problem is multiplicity: Gorman and Warne (2025) note that testing multiple dependent variables in several ways — without accounting for the number of tests — inflates the true false-positive rate well above the nominal 5%.
| Source | Finding | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Borg, Barnett, Caldwell, White & Stewart (2023) J. Sci. Med. Sport | Excess of results just below p = .05 across 1,599 SEM articles | The literature chases statistical significance |
| Sainani (2018); Lohse, Sainani et al. (2020) MSSE; PLOS ONE | MBI inflates Type I error (12–45%); used in 232 papers | An invalid inference method was applied at scale |
| Mesquida, Murphy, Lakens & Warne (2023) J. Sports Sciences | Suboptimal reporting of test statistics, effect sizes and CIs | Estimation is not yet standard practice |
| Knudson (2017) Sports Biomechanics | Recurrent statistical/reporting errors; inflated inferences from small samples | Misinterpretation extends across sub-disciplines |
| Gorman & Warne (2025) J. Sports Sciences | Multiple dependent variables tested without correction inflate the error rate | Multiplicity is under-controlled |
| Wasserstein & Lazar (2016) Amer. Statistician (adjacent) | p-values do not measure effect size or the probability the null is true | Defines the correct interpretation being missed |
Several independent problems compound. The published literature is skewed toward just-significant results; an invalid inference method (MBI) was used in hundreds of papers; effect sizes and confidence intervals are still under-reported relative to bare significance; and multiplicity is frequently uncontrolled. Together these mean that a “significant” result in the field is often over-interpreted — treated as evidence of a real, important, replicable effect when it may be none of these.
The corrective knowledge is, however, well established and increasingly visible. The ASA statement on p-values and the estimation (“new statistics”) approach are widely available; the MBI critiques have measurably reduced its use; and sport-specific meta-research (Borg et al., 2023; Mesquida et al., 2023) is now quantifying these problems and pushing estimation and transparency. The concern is substantial but actively being addressed.
Borg, D. N., Barnett, A. G., Caldwell, A. R., White, N. M., & Stewart, I. B. (2023). The bias for statistical significance in sport and exercise medicine. Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport, 26(3), 164–168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsams.2023.03.002
Gorman, B. T., & Warne, J. (2025). Powering a study for more than one dependent variable: a letter to the editor regarding the editorial “sample size estimation revisited”. Journal of Sports Sciences. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/02640414.2025.2541432
Knudson, D. (2017). Confidence crisis of results in biomechanics research. Sports Biomechanics, 16(4), 425–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/14763141.2016.1246603
Lohse, K. R., Sainani, K. L., Taylor, J. A., Butson, M. L., Knight, E. J., & Vickers, A. J. (2020). Systematic review of the use of “magnitude-based inference” in sports science and medicine. PLOS ONE, 15(6), e0235318. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0235318
Mesquida, C., Murphy, J., Lakens, D., & Warne, J. (2023). Publication bias, statistical power and reporting practices in the Journal of Sports Sciences: potential barriers to replicability. Journal of Sports Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1080/02640414.2023.2269357
Sainani, K. L. (2018). The problem with “magnitude-based inference”. Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise, 50(10), 2166–2176. https://doi.org/10.1249/MSS.0000000000001645
Wasserstein, R. L., & Lazar, N. A. (2016). The ASA statement on p-values: context, process, and purpose. The American Statistician, 70(2), 129–133. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2016.1154108
Cumming, G. (2014). The new statistics: why and how. Psychological Science, 25(1), 7–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613504966